How important is the majority party in Congress in shaping the broad contours of economic policy? Different theories of legislative policymaking yield strikingly different predictions. In cartel theories of party power McCubbins 2002, 2005) , the majority party leadership controls the agenda, and uses its power to move policy towards the preferences of the median member of the majority party. The median Democrat and the median Republican are likely to have sharply different preferences, so switches in the majority party may have large effects on expected economic policies. In contrast, if the party label chosen by a legislator is only a rough description of preferences in a policy space (as in Krehbiel, 1993) policy will be determined by the median legislator. Elections that change the majority party rarely move the preferences of the median representative by much, so elections are unlikely to have much effect on expectations about economic policy. 1 Using the approach developed in Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) , we precisely estimate financial market responses to changes in the majority party in Congress. Specifically, we analyze the response of equity, currency, oil and bond prices to sharp changes in the probability that each party would gain a Congressional majority in the 2006 midterm elections.
We measure these political shocks using high-frequency prediction market data, and focus on the period when the vote count was underway (and hence after votes were cast), thereby isolating a period in which the link between political and economic expectations reflects only the influence of changing electoral expectations on expectations about economic policy.
2 Comparing these new estimates of the effects of changes in Congressional majorities to our earlier estimates of the effects of a switch in the party of the President, we find that changes in the majority party in Congress yield substantially smaller effects. We also find evidence inconsistent with the popular conception that markets prefer the President and a majority of Congress to be from different parties.
3
Since this notion is premised on divided control resulting in lower legislative productivity, our result is consistent with the findings in Mayhew (1991) .
The 2006 Election
In the run-up to the 2006 Congressional elections, Tradesports.com created two contracts tied to Republican majorities in Congress: one paid $10 if Republicans maintained a majority in the Senate, the other $10 if they maintained a majority in the House. As illustrated in Figure 1 , the House contract traded at $2 at the beginning of election night, suggesting that Republicans had a 20% chance of maintaining their majority in the House. Notes: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. (White (1980) In contrast to our Senate results, the effects of partisan majorities in the House are imprecisely estimated reflecting the fact that the election outcome-a Democratic majority-was widely expected, yielding little election-night variation. Even so, these estimates, while statistically indistinguishable from either zero or the corresponding Senate estimates, are clearly smaller than the effects of a change in the party of the President.
We can be much more precise about the effects of the Senate majority due to the large shifts in election probabilities during a time of night that was free of other news. The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates the close link between the stock market and the Republican's fluctuating electoral fortunes between 9 p.m. EST on election day and 2 a.m. the day after.
During this period, the probability of a Republican majority in the Senate first rose from 60% to 90% and then plummeted to 10%, and the value of the S&P 500 moved in lockstep with the Tradesports contract. This high correlation drives the precision of our estimates, while the relatively small size of the equity price movements through this period explains the small estimated effect. This example also illustrates an advantage of using prediction markets in event studies-they allow us to isolate periods in which political news is the dominant force driving financial markets.
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Over this period the likelihood of a Republican majority in the Senate was largely determined by the probability of Republican wins in Virginia and Missouri. Thus, the associated decline in equity prices may be due either to the small change in the preferences of the median Senator, or the change in the majority party, or both. Even if the equity response is driven entirely by the change in the majority party, this is not strong support for cartel theories. 
Previous Elections
We now turn to analyzing related information from prior mid-term elections. The 1998 midterm election was-unfortunately for our purposes-largely a foregone conclusion, with the Iowa Electronic Markets correctly projecting the continuing Republican majorities with a 90% probability.
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The 1994 midterms provided some big surprises, and hence some useful experiments.
On the night before the 1994 election, data from the Iowa Electronic Market suggested that
Republicans had a 70% chance of gaining a majority in the Senate, and only a 20% chance of taking the House. A search of newswire reports from election night 1994 reveals that there was little information about outcomes released before 4 p.m. EST, and that both chambers were called for the Republicans by 11 p.m. EST. Over this seven hour event window the S&P 500 steadily rose (Figure 3) , yielding a total gain of 0.40% (standard error = 0.29%); oil prices rose $0.26 ($0.07), the price of the Yen rose 0.17% (.18%), the price of the German Mark (the major European currency before the Euro) rose 0.20% (.17%) and the 10 year Treasury note yield was unchanged. 13 While some of these shifts are statistically significant, scaling these shifts by the corresponding electoral surprise (combining both the effects of a largely surprising Republican
House victory and an expected Senate victory), we are again led to conclude that the party of the 11 Including data from the House race as a control does not change our estimates. 12 The Iowa Electronic markets ran contracts on Congressional majorities in both 1998 and 1994, but we have access only to the daily closing prices, rather than high-frequency price data we used in 2002 and 2006. 13 Standard errors (in parentheses) are the standard deviation of changes in these variables over 4-11 p.m. EST for 50 weekdays before and 50 weekdays after the election. This yields a standard error identical to what one would obtain from a traditional event study approach of regressing daily 4-11 PM EST returns on an election night dummy. There was almost no overnight trading activity in the Canadian Dollar and 2 year Treasury note in 1994.
majority in Congress has smaller effects on these financial prices than the party in the White House. 14 Given the stronger historical incumbency advantage for Congress than for the Presidency, one might expect a Congressional election outcome like 1994 to have longer lasting implications for partisan control than a Presidential election outcome, and thus our comparison may overstate the relative near-term impact of Congress.
Discussion
In order for partisan majorities in Congress to have an effect on economic outcomes, the parties must both have different preferences over economic policy, and the ability to implement their preferred policy once in the majority. The evidence in Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) Finally, our data can speak to the popular perception that markets prefer divided government to unified control by either party. For instance, the equity market fell in response to
Democrats winning a House majority in 2006, despite the fact that this result also created divided government. Similarly, in 2002, the equity market rose in response to the Democrats' losing their Senate majority, which eliminated divided government. This suggests that the response of markets to the Republican victory in 1994 more likely reflects a preference for Republican control than divided government. All told, any value markets place on divided versus unified government must be very small in comparison with the already inconsequential amount they prefer Republican to Democratic majorities in Congress.
We should conclude with two important qualifications about our results. First, as with other applications of the event study method, our approach estimates market expectations about future policy, rather than actual differences in these policies. And second, the financial variables we analyze do not speak directly to economic welfare or yield immediate normative implications.
